Initial commit
Initial commit.
This commit is contained in:
920
bootloader/mcuboot/boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c
Normal file
920
bootloader/mcuboot/boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,920 @@
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/*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2017-2019 Linaro LTD
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* Copyright (c) 2016-2019 JUUL Labs
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* Copyright (c) 2019-2024 Arm Limited
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*
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* Original license:
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*
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* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
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* or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
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* distributed with this work for additional information
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* regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
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* to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
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||||
* "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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* with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
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* software distributed under the License is distributed on an
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* "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
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* KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
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* specific language governing permissions and limitations
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* under the License.
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*/
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <flash_map_backend/flash_map_backend.h>
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#include "bootutil/image.h"
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#include "bootutil/crypto/sha.h"
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#include "bootutil/sign_key.h"
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#include "bootutil/security_cnt.h"
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#include "bootutil/fault_injection_hardening.h"
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#include "mcuboot_config/mcuboot_config.h"
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#if defined(MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES)
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#include <nrf_compress/implementation.h>
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#include <compression/decompression.h>
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#endif
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#include "bootutil/bootutil_log.h"
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BOOT_LOG_MODULE_DECLARE(mcuboot);
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES
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#include "bootutil/enc_key.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA)
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#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC256)
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#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES) || defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA) || \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC256)
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#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
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#endif
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#include "bootutil_priv.h"
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#ifndef MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE
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/*
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* Compute SHA hash over the image.
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* (SHA384 if ECDSA-P384 is being used,
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* SHA256 otherwise).
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*/
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static int
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bootutil_img_hash(struct enc_key_data *enc_state, int image_index,
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struct image_header *hdr, const struct flash_area *fap,
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uint8_t *tmp_buf, uint32_t tmp_buf_sz, uint8_t *hash_result,
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uint8_t *seed, int seed_len)
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{
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bootutil_sha_context sha_ctx;
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uint32_t size;
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uint16_t hdr_size;
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uint32_t blk_off;
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uint32_t tlv_off;
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#if !defined(MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY)
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int rc;
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uint32_t off;
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uint32_t blk_sz;
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#endif
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#if (BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER == 1) || !defined(MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES) || \
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defined(MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD)
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(void)enc_state;
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(void)image_index;
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(void)hdr_size;
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(void)blk_off;
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(void)tlv_off;
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD
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(void)blk_sz;
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(void)off;
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(void)rc;
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(void)fap;
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(void)tmp_buf;
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(void)tmp_buf_sz;
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#endif
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#endif
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES
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/* Encrypted images only exist in the secondary slot */
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if (MUST_DECRYPT(fap, image_index, hdr) &&
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!boot_enc_valid(enc_state, 1)) {
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return -1;
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}
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#endif
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bootutil_sha_init(&sha_ctx);
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/* in some cases (split image) the hash is seeded with data from
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* the loader image */
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if (seed && (seed_len > 0)) {
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx, seed, seed_len);
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}
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/* Hash is computed over image header and image itself. */
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size = hdr_size = hdr->ih_hdr_size;
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size += hdr->ih_img_size;
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tlv_off = size;
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/* If protected TLVs are present they are also hashed. */
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size += hdr->ih_protect_tlv_size;
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY
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/* No chunk loading, storage is mapped to address space and can
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* be directly given to hashing function.
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*/
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx, (void *)flash_area_get_off(fap), size);
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#else /* MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY */
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx,
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(void*)(IMAGE_RAM_BASE + hdr->ih_load_addr),
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size);
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#else
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for (off = 0; off < size; off += blk_sz) {
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blk_sz = size - off;
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if (blk_sz > tmp_buf_sz) {
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blk_sz = tmp_buf_sz;
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}
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES
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/* The only data that is encrypted in an image is the payload;
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* both header and TLVs (when protected) are not.
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*/
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if ((off < hdr_size) && ((off + blk_sz) > hdr_size)) {
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/* read only the header */
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blk_sz = hdr_size - off;
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}
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if ((off < tlv_off) && ((off + blk_sz) > tlv_off)) {
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/* read only up to the end of the image payload */
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blk_sz = tlv_off - off;
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}
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#endif
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rc = flash_area_read(fap, off, tmp_buf, blk_sz);
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if (rc) {
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bootutil_sha_drop(&sha_ctx);
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return rc;
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}
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#ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES
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if (MUST_DECRYPT(fap, image_index, hdr)) {
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/* Only payload is encrypted (area between header and TLVs) */
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int slot = flash_area_id_to_multi_image_slot(image_index,
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flash_area_get_id(fap));
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if (off >= hdr_size && off < tlv_off) {
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blk_off = (off - hdr_size) & 0xf;
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boot_enc_decrypt(enc_state, slot, off - hdr_size,
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blk_sz, blk_off, tmp_buf);
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}
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}
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#endif
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx, tmp_buf, blk_sz);
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}
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#endif /* MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD */
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#endif /* MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY */
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bootutil_sha_finish(&sha_ctx, hash_result);
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bootutil_sha_drop(&sha_ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* Currently, we only support being able to verify one type of
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* signature, because there is a single verification function that we
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* call. List the type of TLV we are expecting. If we aren't
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* configured for any signature, don't define this macro.
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*/
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#if (defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA) + \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC256) + \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384) + \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_ED25519)) > 1
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#error "Only a single signature type is supported!"
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#endif
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#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA)
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# if MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA_LEN == 2048
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_TLV IMAGE_TLV_RSA2048_PSS
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# elif MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA_LEN == 3072
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_TLV IMAGE_TLV_RSA3072_PSS
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# else
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# error "Unsupported RSA signature length"
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# endif
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# define SIG_BUF_SIZE (MCUBOOT_SIGN_RSA_LEN / 8)
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(x) ((x) == SIG_BUF_SIZE) /* 2048 bits */
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#elif defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC256) || \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384) || \
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defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC)
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_TLV IMAGE_TLV_ECDSA_SIG
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# define SIG_BUF_SIZE 128
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(x) (1) /* always true, ASN.1 will validate */
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#elif defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_ED25519)
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_TLV IMAGE_TLV_ED25519
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# define SIG_BUF_SIZE 64
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# define EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(x) ((x) == SIG_BUF_SIZE)
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#else
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# define SIG_BUF_SIZE 32 /* no signing, sha256 digest only */
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#endif
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#if (defined(MCUBOOT_HW_KEY) + \
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defined(MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY)) > 1
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#error "Please use either MCUBOOT_HW_KEY or the MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY feature."
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#endif
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#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
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#if !defined(MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY)
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#if !defined(MCUBOOT_HW_KEY)
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/* The key TLV contains the hash of the public key. */
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# define EXPECTED_KEY_TLV IMAGE_TLV_KEYHASH
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# define KEY_BUF_SIZE IMAGE_HASH_SIZE
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#else
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/* The key TLV contains the whole public key.
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* Add a few extra bytes to the key buffer size for encoding and
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* for public exponent.
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*/
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# define EXPECTED_KEY_TLV IMAGE_TLV_PUBKEY
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# define KEY_BUF_SIZE (SIG_BUF_SIZE + 24)
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#endif /* !MCUBOOT_HW_KEY */
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#if !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU)
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#if !defined(MCUBOOT_HW_KEY)
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static int
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bootutil_find_key(uint8_t *keyhash, uint8_t keyhash_len)
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{
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bootutil_sha_context sha_ctx;
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int i;
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const struct bootutil_key *key;
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uint8_t hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE];
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if (keyhash_len > IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) {
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return -1;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < bootutil_key_cnt; i++) {
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key = &bootutil_keys[i];
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bootutil_sha_init(&sha_ctx);
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx, key->key, *key->len);
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bootutil_sha_finish(&sha_ctx, hash);
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if (!memcmp(hash, keyhash, keyhash_len)) {
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bootutil_sha_drop(&sha_ctx);
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return i;
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}
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}
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bootutil_sha_drop(&sha_ctx);
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return -1;
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}
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#else /* !MCUBOOT_HW_KEY */
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extern unsigned int pub_key_len;
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static int
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bootutil_find_key(uint8_t image_index, uint8_t *key, uint16_t key_len)
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{
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bootutil_sha_context sha_ctx;
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uint8_t hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE];
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uint8_t key_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE];
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size_t key_hash_size = sizeof(key_hash);
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int rc;
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FIH_DECLARE(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
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bootutil_sha_init(&sha_ctx);
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bootutil_sha_update(&sha_ctx, key, key_len);
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bootutil_sha_finish(&sha_ctx, hash);
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bootutil_sha_drop(&sha_ctx);
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rc = boot_retrieve_public_key_hash(image_index, key_hash, &key_hash_size);
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if (rc) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* Adding hardening to avoid this potential attack:
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* - Image is signed with an arbitrary key and the corresponding public
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* key is added as a TLV field.
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* - During public key validation (comparing against key-hash read from
|
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* HW) a fault is injected to accept the public key as valid one.
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*/
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FIH_CALL(boot_fih_memequal, fih_rc, hash, key_hash, key_hash_size);
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if (FIH_EQ(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
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bootutil_keys[0].key = key;
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pub_key_len = key_len;
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return 0;
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}
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return -1;
|
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}
|
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#endif /* !MCUBOOT_HW_KEY */
|
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#endif /* !MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY */
|
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#endif /* !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU) */
|
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#endif /* EXPECTED_SIG_TLV */
|
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|
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/**
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* Reads the value of an image's security counter.
|
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*
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* @param hdr Pointer to the image header structure.
|
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* @param fap Pointer to a description structure of the image's
|
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* flash area.
|
||||
* @param security_cnt Pointer to store the security counter value.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @return 0 on success; nonzero on failure.
|
||||
*/
|
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int32_t
|
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bootutil_get_img_security_cnt(struct image_header *hdr,
|
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const struct flash_area *fap,
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uint32_t *img_security_cnt)
|
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{
|
||||
struct image_tlv_iter it;
|
||||
uint32_t off;
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uint16_t len;
|
||||
int32_t rc;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((hdr == NULL) ||
|
||||
(fap == NULL) ||
|
||||
(img_security_cnt == NULL)) {
|
||||
/* Invalid parameter. */
|
||||
return BOOT_EBADARGS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The security counter TLV is in the protected part of the TLV area. */
|
||||
if (hdr->ih_protect_tlv_size == 0) {
|
||||
return BOOT_EBADIMAGE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT, true);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Traverse through the protected TLV area to find
|
||||
* the security counter TLV.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, NULL);
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
/* Security counter TLV has not been found. */
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (len != sizeof(*img_security_cnt)) {
|
||||
/* Security counter is not valid. */
|
||||
return BOOT_EBADIMAGE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, img_security_cnt, len);
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
return BOOT_EFLASH;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
/* Returns:
|
||||
* 0 -- found
|
||||
* 1 -- not found or found but not true
|
||||
* -1 -- failed for some reason
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Value of TLV does not matter, presence decides.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int bootutil_check_for_pure(const struct image_header *hdr,
|
||||
const struct flash_area *fap)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct image_tlv_iter it;
|
||||
uint32_t off;
|
||||
uint16_t len;
|
||||
int32_t rc;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_SIG_PURE, false);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Search for the TLV */
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, NULL);
|
||||
if (rc == 0 && len == 1) {
|
||||
bool val;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, &val, 1);
|
||||
if (rc == 0) {
|
||||
rc = !val;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef ALLOW_ROGUE_TLVS
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The following list of TLVs are the only entries allowed in the unprotected
|
||||
* TLV section. All other TLV entries must be in the protected section.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static const uint16_t allowed_unprot_tlvs[] = {
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_KEYHASH,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_PUBKEY,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_SHA256,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_SHA384,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_SHA512,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_RSA2048_PSS,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ECDSA224,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ECDSA_SIG,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_RSA3072_PSS,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ED25519,
|
||||
#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_SIG_PURE,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ENC_RSA2048,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ENC_KW,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ENC_EC256,
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ENC_X25519,
|
||||
/* Mark end with ANY. */
|
||||
IMAGE_TLV_ANY,
|
||||
};
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Verify the integrity of the image.
|
||||
* Return non-zero if image could not be validated/does not validate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fih_ret
|
||||
bootutil_img_validate(struct enc_key_data *enc_state, int image_index,
|
||||
struct image_header *hdr, const struct flash_area *fap,
|
||||
uint8_t *tmp_buf, uint32_t tmp_buf_sz, uint8_t *seed,
|
||||
int seed_len, uint8_t *out_hash)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint32_t off;
|
||||
uint16_t len;
|
||||
uint16_t type;
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
|
||||
FIH_DECLARE(valid_signature, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
#ifndef MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY
|
||||
int key_id = -1;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/* Pass a key ID equal to the image index, the underlying crypto library
|
||||
* is responsible for mapping the image index to a builtin key ID.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int key_id = image_index;
|
||||
#endif /* !MCUBOOT_BUILTIN_KEY */
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_HW_KEY
|
||||
uint8_t key_buf[KEY_BUF_SIZE];
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif /* EXPECTED_SIG_TLV */
|
||||
struct image_tlv_iter it;
|
||||
uint8_t buf[SIG_BUF_SIZE];
|
||||
#if defined(EXPECTED_HASH_TLV) && !defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
int image_hash_valid = 0;
|
||||
uint8_t hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
FIH_DECLARE(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT
|
||||
fih_int security_cnt = fih_int_encode(INT_MAX);
|
||||
uint32_t img_security_cnt = 0;
|
||||
FIH_DECLARE(security_counter_valid, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES
|
||||
/* If the image is compressed, the integrity of the image must also be validated */
|
||||
if (MUST_DECOMPRESS(fap, image_index, hdr)) {
|
||||
bool found_decompressed_size = false;
|
||||
bool found_decompressed_sha = false;
|
||||
bool found_decompressed_signature = false;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_ANY, true);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (it.tlv_end > bootutil_max_image_size(fap)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
uint16_t expected_size = 0;
|
||||
bool *found_flag = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, &type);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
case IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIZE:
|
||||
expected_size = sizeof(size_t);
|
||||
found_flag = &found_decompressed_size;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SHA:
|
||||
expected_size = IMAGE_HASH_SIZE;
|
||||
found_flag = &found_decompressed_sha;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIGNATURE:
|
||||
found_flag = &found_decompressed_signature;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (type == IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIGNATURE && !EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(len)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (type != IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIGNATURE && len != expected_size) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*found_flag = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = (!found_decompressed_size || !found_decompressed_sha || !found_decompressed_signature);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(EXPECTED_HASH_TLV) && !defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
rc = bootutil_img_hash(enc_state, image_index, hdr, fap, tmp_buf,
|
||||
tmp_buf_sz, hash, seed, seed_len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (out_hash) {
|
||||
memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
/* If Pure type signature is expected then it has to be there */
|
||||
rc = bootutil_check_for_pure(hdr, fap);
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_ANY, false);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (it.tlv_end > bootutil_max_image_size(fap)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Traverse through all of the TLVs, performing any checks we know
|
||||
* and are able to do.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, &type);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef ALLOW_ROGUE_TLVS
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Ensure that the non-protected TLV only has entries necessary to hold
|
||||
* the signature. We also allow encryption related keys to be in the
|
||||
* unprotected area.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!bootutil_tlv_iter_is_prot(&it, off)) {
|
||||
bool found = false;
|
||||
for (const uint16_t *p = allowed_unprot_tlvs; *p != IMAGE_TLV_ANY; p++) {
|
||||
if (type == *p) {
|
||||
found = true;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!found) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
switch(type) {
|
||||
#if defined(EXPECTED_HASH_TLV) && !defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
case EXPECTED_HASH_TLV:
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Verify the image hash. This must always be present. */
|
||||
if (len != sizeof(hash)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIH_CALL(boot_fih_memequal, fih_rc, hash, buf, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
if (FIH_NOT_EQ(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
image_hash_valid = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(EXPECTED_HASH_TLV) && !defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE) */
|
||||
#if !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU)
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_KEY_TLV
|
||||
case EXPECTED_KEY_TLV:
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Determine which key we should be checking.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (len > KEY_BUF_SIZE) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifndef MCUBOOT_HW_KEY
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
key_id = bootutil_find_key(buf, len);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, key_buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
key_id = bootutil_find_key(image_index, key_buf, len);
|
||||
#endif /* !MCUBOOT_HW_KEY */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The key may not be found, which is acceptable. There
|
||||
* can be multiple signatures, each preceded by a key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* EXPECTED_KEY_TLV */
|
||||
#endif /* !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU) */
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
|
||||
case EXPECTED_SIG_TLV:
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU)
|
||||
/* Ignore this signature if it is out of bounds. */
|
||||
if (key_id < 0 || key_id >= bootutil_key_cnt) {
|
||||
key_id = -1;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* !defined(CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_USING_KMU) */
|
||||
if (!EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(len) || len > sizeof(buf)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifndef MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE
|
||||
FIH_CALL(bootutil_verify_sig, valid_signature, hash, sizeof(hash),
|
||||
buf, len, key_id);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/* Directly check signature on the image, by using the mapping of
|
||||
* a device to memory. The pointer is beginning of image in flash,
|
||||
* so offset of area, the range is header + image + protected tlvs.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
FIH_CALL(bootutil_verify_img, valid_signature, (void *)flash_area_get_off(fap),
|
||||
hdr->ih_hdr_size + hdr->ih_img_size + hdr->ih_protect_tlv_size,
|
||||
buf, len, key_id);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
key_id = -1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* EXPECTED_SIG_TLV */
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT
|
||||
case IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT:
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Verify the image's security counter.
|
||||
* This must always be present.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (len != sizeof(img_security_cnt)) {
|
||||
/* Security counter is not valid. */
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, &img_security_cnt, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIH_CALL(boot_nv_security_counter_get, fih_rc, image_index,
|
||||
&security_cnt);
|
||||
if (FIH_NOT_EQ(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Compare the new image's security counter value against the
|
||||
* stored security counter value.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fih_rc = fih_ret_encode_zero_equality(img_security_cnt <
|
||||
(uint32_t)fih_int_decode(security_cnt));
|
||||
if (FIH_NOT_EQ(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The image's security counter has been successfully verified. */
|
||||
security_counter_valid = fih_rc;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(EXPECTED_HASH_TLV) && !defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
rc = !image_hash_valid;
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#elif defined(MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE)
|
||||
/* This returns true on EQ, rc is err on non-0 */
|
||||
rc = FIH_NOT_EQ(valid_signature, FIH_SUCCESS);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, valid_signature);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT
|
||||
if (FIH_NOT_EQ(security_counter_valid, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES
|
||||
/* Only after all previous verifications have passed, perform a dry-run of the decompression
|
||||
* and ensure the image is valid
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!rc && MUST_DECOMPRESS(fap, image_index, hdr)) {
|
||||
image_hash_valid = 0;
|
||||
FIH_SET(valid_signature, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_img_hash_decompress(enc_state, image_index, hdr, fap, tmp_buf, tmp_buf_sz,
|
||||
hash, seed, seed_len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SHA, true);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (it.tlv_end > bootutil_max_image_size(fap)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, &type);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (type == IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SHA) {
|
||||
/* Verify the image hash. This must always be present. */
|
||||
if (len != sizeof(hash)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIH_CALL(boot_fih_memequal, fih_rc, hash, buf, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
if (FIH_NOT_EQ(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
image_hash_valid = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = !image_hash_valid;
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_KEY_TLV
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, EXPECTED_KEY_TLV, false);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (it.tlv_end > bootutil_max_image_size(fap)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, &type);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (type == EXPECTED_KEY_TLV) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Determine which key we should be checking.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (len > KEY_BUF_SIZE) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifndef MCUBOOT_HW_KEY
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
key_id = bootutil_find_key(buf, len);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, key_buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
key_id = bootutil_find_key(image_index, key_buf, len);
|
||||
#endif /* !MCUBOOT_HW_KEY */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The key may not be found, which is acceptable. There
|
||||
* can be multiple signatures, each preceded by a key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* EXPECTED_KEY_TLV */
|
||||
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_begin(&it, hdr, fap, IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIGNATURE, true);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (it.tlv_end > bootutil_max_image_size(fap)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
rc = bootutil_tlv_iter_next(&it, &off, &len, &type);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0) {
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (type == IMAGE_TLV_DECOMP_SIGNATURE) {
|
||||
/* Ignore this signature if it is out of bounds. */
|
||||
if (key_id < 0 || key_id >= bootutil_key_cnt) {
|
||||
key_id = -1;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EXPECTED_SIG_LEN(len) || len > sizeof(buf)) {
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = LOAD_IMAGE_DATA(hdr, fap, off, buf, len);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIH_CALL(bootutil_verify_sig, valid_signature, hash, sizeof(hash),
|
||||
buf, len, key_id);
|
||||
key_id = -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* EXPECTED_SIG_TLV */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef EXPECTED_SIG_TLV
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, valid_signature);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
FIH_SET(fih_rc, FIH_FAILURE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIH_RET(fih_rc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user